01:15 GMT 14th July 2011
Since international law clearly prohibits regime change, the loose interpretation of 'necessary action' to broaden the mandate to include Gaddafi's removal is at best a fraud.
It should also have occurred to Nato leaders that a sectional insurrection is different from a national uprising. In the absence of a national Libyan consensus that Gaddafi must go, attempting regime change was always going to be a problem given that there are enough people ready to defend the regime with their own lives. The fact that the armed forces are suffering casualties and still fighting in defence of the regime tells a lot about the existence or otherwise of such a consensus.
It also appears that Nato leaders spared little thought for the complex nature of Libyan society and even failed to learn their own lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. A country with strong tribal loyalties does not always answer directly to the call for democracy. This is because groups are more comfortable with negotiating their participation in a political entity rather than via one man one vote.
The fear is that Nato, having realised the folly of its actions, is fighting on because of pride. The lure of controlling Libya's oil wealth is also proving irresistible. But fighting on is the worst scenario both for Nato, the rebels and Libyans.
For Nato, the political and economic cost is mounting. The alliance is even squandering its moral capital. When a campaign to protect Libyans from a brutal dictator ends up killing innocent children in their sleep, then virtue becomes a vice. The desperation of the alliance is exposed by its bombing of non-military targets.
It must be clear to everyone now that a military solution is not feasible. Even if Gaddafi is killed, the anger of his supporters will make Libya an unstable state for the next decade. He has survived tlus long because his supporters are greater in number than those opposed to him. It will not help the cause of democracy in Libya if his removal is as a result of the intervention of foreign powers. Recent history has enough examples to prove that outside intervention complicates political transition.
The way out at tl1is stage is a political solution. The rebels are spurning negotiations because they enjoy Nato's military support. Nato has to force the rebels to call for a cease fire and use that as a facesaving route to stop the bombing.
After more than three months of bombing, Gaddafi is weakened and will negotiate. If he resists negotiations, those around him will push against his position. The ball is in Nato's court. As Gaddafi himself has put it, his back is against the wall. The combination of a potential ICC trial and the attempts of Nato to kill him, in me absence of a negotiated settlement, do not give him an exit route.
After the Libyan crisis is resolved, Africa must learn some hard lessons. The key one is that the continent must re-discover its diplomatic relevance. The manner in which Nato has operated, without reference to the position of me Africans, is the most damning verdict on the irrelevance of the continent in global geopolitics.
Africa must start developing independent positions on global issues rather than towing the position of the West.
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