12:33 GMT 15th July 2011
Another consideration that favours a negotiated settlement is the fact that the Obama administration needs to secure an early end to the Libyan crisis, largely because the US Congress remains critical of the intervention. For it is becoming clear by the day that Obama might have miscalculated his ability to depend on the traditional jump in popularity ratings that accompanies bellicose action by US presidents abroad. Normally, the Republicans in Congress tend to support such military action in the spirit of bi-partisanship.
This works especially well when the enemy happens to be a hate figure like 'mad' Colonel Gaddafi. However, this time, Obama's Republican opponents appear to hate him more than they hate Gaddafi, and are therefore not quite playing to type. So much so that Obama's Republican opponent in the 200S election, Senator John McCain, has felt obliged to warn his colleagues against reverting to the isolationism that sometimes permeates the party's foreign policy.
The explanation for the Republican unwillingness to get on board with Obama over Libya is that 2011 is a pre-election year, and many Republicans regard Obama's eviction from the White House as a much more important objective. Hence the not-so-muted talk in the corridors of the US Congress in Washington that the Republicans may attempt to impeach Obama for going to war in Libya without seeking Congressional approval.
Obama's position has been weakened by the disclosure that two members of his own legal team advised him that it would be unlawful to engage in military action in Libya without Congress' consent. This is a controversy that Obama could do without at the moment, given the fact that he is also under heavy attack over a US economy that refuses to respond to his attempts to lift it out of recession.
Another development that may encourage the Obama government to push for an early solution to the Libyan crisis is the public admission by the Afghanistan leader, Hamid Karzai, that his government and its US allies have begun talking to the Taliban to try and bring an end to the conflict there. The Taliban have been even more extensively demonised in American eyes than Gaddafi - if the Americans are talking to them then talking to Gaddafi won't sound so bad. The question is, what would happen to the US and Nato demand that Gaddafi must go? In practical politics, where pragmatism often triumphs over fixed positions, this demand could be tossed aside.
Of course, Gaddafi himself will do everything to resist negotiations with the rebels. But he is under intense pressure already - from members of his own government and his security forces. The safety of his family must also be of increasing concern to him, given the ruthlessness of Nato's relentless bombing campaign.
On the rebels' side, their recent revelation that they are 'short of money' adds to their increasing criticism of the inadequacy of Nato's actions on their behalf. In addition, the serious political divisions that Nato has been exhibiting, will have dealt a blow to their morale. And, of course, if they are wise, they will not discount the flak that Obama is getting because of his support for them.
If the rebels don't show willingness to negotiate when the Americans tell them to do so, they may end up with nothing. Even a confederated Libya, in which parts of the country remain in the hands of Gaddafi, would be better than nothing. If the rebels accept such a solution, it won't be the first time the Americans have brokered a limited settlement against the wishes of a side they have been supporting. The talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan show that they are doing it with Karzai. The Americans also ditched their South Vietnamese allies in 1975. If they could do it in Vietnam, where the stakes were much higher, then they can do it in Libya.
Gaddafi, too, may not have any choice in the matter. For he must know that he is responsible for the weaknesses in his regime that his opponents have taken advantage of to try and topple him.
His first weakness is the sheer longevity of his tenure. Forty two years is a very long time for any single individual to be at the helm of a country's affairs. He has run a totalitarian regime, irrespective of the fiction maintained in his Green Book that it is the people of Libya who are the real rulers of the country.
Gaddafi and his family treat Libya's oil riches as if it were their own personal property. Stories have emerged from his erstwhile western bankers that contradict the image they have cultivated as revolutionaries who reject personal vanity in favour of the general good of the Libyan people. The most colourful of Gaddafi's sons, Saif, is reported to own a house in London costing $16.2m. Meanwhile, reports of sibling rivalry - with each son controlling a different branch of the Libyan security forces - do not speak well of a disciplined family.
Gaddafi has also made the mistake of confiscating much of the diplomatic support that ought to accrue to him, as of right, from sister African countries. His abortive campaign to use money to recruit African traditional rulers to declare him 'king of kings' in Africa left a sour taste in the mouths of some of his fellow African heads of state, including two who played a role in the initial task of trying to obtain a negotiated settlement to the conflict - Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Jacob Zuma of South Africa.
Museveni, in particular, while insisting that the west has no right to bomb Libya, had published a clinical critique of Gaddafi's role in Africa, that does not spare Gaddafi's mistakes, including his support of Idi Amin in Uganda and his tendency to re-open pet issues that the AU has already decided upon.
In the current conflict, too, Gaddafi's reported threat to 'unleash' African migrants against Europe, was, if true, unwise. The African migrants issue is an emotive one as many migrant workers have died in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean in overcrowded boats to get into Fortress Europe.
Gaddafi's image has also been damaged by the manner in which black Africans working in Libya are sometimes treated. Some are reported to have been conscripted into Gaddafi's forces, leading to reports that 'black mercenaries' have been killing Libyans - a charge that has led to the rebels killing many blacks on sight.
In 2004, Ghana's DailY Graphic reported that more than 6,000 Ghanaians had been 'precipitately deported from Libya' in a short space of time after being detained in 'dehumanising' detention camps. They were then 'flown down to Ghana on cargo planes without any seats'.
Five years later, the influential Lagos Guardian questioned his 'sudden enthusiasm' for a United States of Africa, when his government was involved in brutality against African migrants.
Gaddafi has also been careless in remarks on the internal affairs of other African countries. For instance, in March last year, he caused immense anger in Nigeria by suggesting that the country should be divided into two - a Christian south and a Muslim north 'to save it from religious strife'.
Among Nigerian politicians who took umbrage with Gaddafi's remark was the Despite his African unity credentials Gaddafi remains isolated continentally then president of the Nigerian Senate, David Mark, who described Gaddafi in just one word, 'mad'. Nigeria's ambassador to Tripoli was then 'recalled for urgent consultations' because of the 'irresponsible utterances of Colonel Gaddafi'.
Ghana and Nigeria are two countries whose diplomatic support should not be discounted by any country that wants to influence the west. That Gaddafi could look on unconcerned, when his officials maltreated their citizens, is probably the reason why protests against Nato's bombing of Libya have been notable by their absence in the rest of Africa.
There is little doubt, in fact, that the failure of the delegations sent to Libya by the AU may be the result of hidden resentments that many African leaders harbour against him. Africa's inconsistency over the Libyan conflict is indeed worrying. For instance, South Africa, whose President Zuma has been at the forefront of the AU's efforts to mediate between the two sides, voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973.
On the wider international scene, too, Libya finds itself confronting ambiguities. Russia's President, Dmitry Medvedev, has said that he favours 'mediation' in the conflict. Yet, at the Group of Eight summit in DeauviUe, France, in May, he signed a declaration agreeing with his western counterparts on Libyan regime change. How can Russia publicly agree, on the one hand, that Gaddafi must go and yet at the same time try to persuade Gaddafi to engage in talks with his opponents?
However, the attempts to broker a peace deal must continue otherwise nothing will be left of Libya's infrastructure, It must somehow be conveyed to Gaddafi that after 42 years of ruling Libya, he must withdraw gracefully or else be pushed aside ignominiously like Ben Ali of Tunisia or Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The last service he can perform for his country will be to accept a formula that enables free elections to be held. The nature of the country's future leadership, as well as the relationship between its constituent parts, must be decided through such a free vote.
Any delay to a solution will only add to Libya's untold suffering. Is the personal pride of an individual worth the price of the near-total incineration of everything he has tried to build for Libya over the past 42 years? How Gaddafi answers this inconvenient question will determine his future place in the history of his now benighted country.
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